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Introduction: research questions and 
context
This article presents some points of reflection 
about aims, means and results of European Com-
munity (EC) programmes aiming to support civil 
society groups in developing countries. It includes 
some findings of a study in which the author has 
been recently engaged, as part of a team reviewing 
the first phase (2007−10) of the EC-funded pro-
gramme Non State Actors and Local Authorities in 
Development (NSA-LA) (EC 2007; McCormick et 
al. 2009). 
The main goal of this programme, which is still 
ongoing, is to strengthen local livelihoods and 
democratic participation of civil society by funding 
initiatives proposed by non-state actors (NSAs) and 
local authorities (LAs). However, the involvement 
of LAs is still marginal compared to the stronger 
role of NSAs; therefore, this article will have a spe-
cific focus on NSAs. The involvement of NSAs is 
meant to bridge the gap between communities and 
donors. Nongovernmental organizations, civil so-
ciety and particularly, vulnerable communities and 
deprived groups, are the main targets of this pro-
gramme, in line with the Millennium Development 
Goals that were officially established following the 
United Nations Millennium Declaration (UN 2000; 
UNDP 2012). The idea behind this choice is that 
NSAs can operate more effectively and liberally 
than state authorities when dealing with civil soci-
ety; therefore, they are considered to be in the best 
position to support grassroots initiatives and em-
power communities. In the next chapter, I will dis-
cuss how this idea is coherent with a broader, neo-
liberal approach that has become internationally 
predominant in the aid sector. 
78 FENNIA 190: 2 (2012)Paola Minoia
The choice to give a stronger role to NSAs and 
LAs is based on their double accountability: on 
one hand, they can operate closely with local 
communities, assess their needs, upscale their 
grassroots initiatives, and represent them in front 
of public authorities or within large and transna-
tional networks (down accountability, Desai 
2008); on the other hand, compared to the infor-
mal grassroots groupings they represent, NSAs and 
LAs are provided with sufficient structural organi-
zation and financial capacities, which make them 
accountable towards the donors (upward account-
ability, ibid.).
According to the EC guidelines, the NSA cate-
gory includes nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs), trade unions, professional associations 
and small and medium enterprises (SMEs); how-
ever, NGOs and, particularly, international NGOs 
(INGOs) are the predominant actors because of 
their more advanced professionalization in the aid 
industry, where cosmopolitanism and profession-
alization, entrepreneurial organisation, financial 
capacity and competitiveness are important assets 
(Baillie Smith & Jenkins 2011). The LAs group in-
cludes decentralized public authorities (PAs) such 
as regions, provinces, municipalities, specialized 
public bodies as well as PAs associations. As far as 
it was observed in several EC projects, LAs are also 
often closely supported by NGOs with particular 
expertise to access external funding.
Based on theories and field assessment work, 
the aim of this article is to discuss the pertinence of 
the European ‘NSA-LA programme’ to effectively 
address the needs of vulnerable groups, empower 
civil society, and respect their agency and local 
ownership. The critical aspects are both in the 
power-relations between NGOs and informal 
communities, and in the logics of the project-cycle 
approach. In fact, external and frequently rushed 
expectations operating through business plans 
may deplete the true potential of the cooperation 
between civil society and the NGOs or other inter-
mediation bodies (Holmén 2009).
This paper is based both on critical develop-
ment theories and on field research carried out as 
part of consultancy work for the EC. Critical theo-
ries have helped in locating the NSAs empower-
ment within a global trend of state disempower-
ment and shift of responsibility towards private 
organizations, social associations and decentral-
ized authorities. Through the field work I could ap-
proach different case studies and observed that 
these same principles were behind the current Eu-
ropean policies of aid towards civil society organi-
zations. Nevertheless, it was relevant to see if spe-
cific programmes like this one have been benefi-
cial towards community-based initiatives; if the 
professionalism of strong NGOs has favoured or 
rather challenged the deployment of grass roots 
initiatives; and what have been the most determin-
ing factors of failure or success at the project level.
A relevant part of the assessment questioned 
about the involvement of local communities in 
project design and implementation. Was the fund-
ing granted to NSAs (often INGOs) concretely sup-
porting local initiatives? How were the partner-
ships between grant holders and beneficiaries 
formed? Were the involved actors representing 
vulnerable and deprived community groups; did 
they reflect their needs and were they able to em-
power them? Did they involve local activists, and 
how was the project approach operationally func-
tioning to support local agency? And finally, were 
calls for proposals adequate to select community-
relevant actions? 
The fieldwork was conducted between Septem-
ber and December 2009. It initially involved a re-
view of academic literature, official documents 
and reports and other sources. Thereafter, semi-
structured interviews and focus groups were or-
ganized in Europe (Belgium and Italy) and in five 
beneficiary countries (Georgia, Occupied Palestin-
ian Territory, Zimbabwe, Rwanda and Cameroon) 
with EU and national civil servants, NGOs opera-
tors, trade-unionists and cooperative workers en-
gaged in aid activities. A few project sites were 
also visited. Each one of the visited countries has 
shown different NSAs’ needs and working condi-
tions1. 
Debating non-state actors in public 
fields
Programmes of direct support from large donor in-
stitutions towards NGOs have been criticized for 
being politically biased towards goals conceived 
externally, rather than reflecting local interests. 
Critical and post-development scholars have high-
lighted the controversial relations that are embed-
ded in aid activities characterized by external in-
ference into the local sovereignty, and recognized 
as post-colonial relations (Escobar 1995; Sparke 
2006). Nowadays, proposals that do not refer to 
the Millennium Development Goals, or that are 
not aligned with policy goals of economic liberal-
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ism and western-style democracy, end up with lit-
tle support from international donors.
Contradictions and risks are caused by various 
pressures for paths of change. Some common fea-
tures have been observed in the literature. First of 
all, pressures for democratic reforms are often 
driven by external actors, either directly or indi-
rectly, rather than by intrinsic political dynamism 
(Willis 2005). Second, the newly empowered ac-
tors are often professional mediators, far from be-
ing expressions of the social capital available with-
in the target systems (Casson et al. 2009). A third 
common aspect relates to the global neoliberal en-
vironment which calls for the NSA to engage in 
service provision that was previously under the 
public administrations’ responsibility. In develop-
ing countries, where public budgets have been se-
verely cut by structural adjustment programmes 
promoted by the World Bank since the eighties in 
order to decrease state spending, vital services 
have been transferred either to the private sector, 
particularly when the service has a secure market 
value (e.g. municipal water supplies, energy distri-
bution, public transport), or to other non-for-profit 
associations (Harvey 2005). 
In neoliberal environments, discourses and ide-
ological contexts have been constructed to not 
only legitimize reduced state control over their 
own territories, but to make it normatively desira-
ble (Swyngedow 2007). Forms of public-private 
partnership have been introduced, raising impor-
tant questions of governance, because of shifts in 
the axis of responsibilities, traditionally assigned 
to state actors representing the public good, to-
wards private entities. In some cases, state’s with-
drawals and transfer of responsibilities are embed-
ded in the discourses of local communities’ em-
powerment, and associations have been created 
by top-down regulations, with no sufficient trans-
fer of capacities and financial means to act in tech-
nically complex situations. The result has often 
been far from a social empowerment; instead, fur-
ther deprivation and emigrations of affected com-
munities have been observed (Minoia & Guglielmi 
2008).
From the Johannesburg Summit (UN 2002) on-
wards, practices of the state’s disengagement and 
intervention of non-public entities have become 
widely accepted and have incorporated new val-
ues. Particular emphasis has been given to the po-
litical aspects of governance. NGOs are generally 
considered to be able to act closer to the people 
and thus, to have better potential to respond ade-
quately to their needs. They are seen as comple-
mentary to public institutions not only to provide 
basic services to marginalized communities, but 
also as community-speakers in front of institution-
al authorities, and as representatives of the civil 
society. Moreover, they are considered to enhance 
democratic relations and to respect human rights, 
playing the role of watchdog relative to the prac-
tises of public authorities (Welch & Nuru 2006). 
The role of NGOs in good governance has been 
recognized to be fundamental for the achievement 
of the Millennium Development Goals and their 
involvement is a requirement in the poverty reduc-
tion strategy of the World Bank (Levinsohn 2003). 
A UNDP Report (2002) even considers the number 
of developmental NGOs as an ‘objectively good 
governance’ indicator.
Other points of view, however, consider this 
transition from representative governments to gov-
ernance as a serious problem of democracy inher-
ent in neoliberal systems (Harvey 2005). This prob-
lem appears more evident when it involves private 
business companies, but it is seldom recognized 
when it involves NGOs. 
In critical development literature, ideas of mys-
tification of the NGOs roles have been further un-
veiled, to the extent that a tyranny in participation 
has been conceptualised (Cooke & Kothari 2001). 
The critique regards the strong influence of NGOs 
in establishing the agenda of local development, 
despite a lack of delegation from the targeted civil 
society. According to these arguments, the NGO 
strengthening would pre-empt true democracy, be-
cause of a lack of transparency vis-à-vis the mode 
of formation, appointed boards of representatives 
and core missions of these powerful bodies. 
Progress in this concept has also deployed a po-
larization of NGOs: on the one hand, large and 
mainly international NGOs are able to increase 
their business and influence, while on the other 
hand, weaker entities engage their participation in 
a form of subjection towards this donor-centred 
system and with a de-politicization of their origi-
nal agenda (Williams 2004).
This debate has recently reached donors and is 
being considered by the European officers in 
charge of international aid programmes. Com-
pared to other public institutions (i.e. USAID), the 
European Union is relatively new to forms of direct 
cooperation with NSA, not channelled via state 
bodies of the beneficiary countries. For this rea-
son, a mid-term evaluation was called in 2009 to 
assess the effectiveness of this form of aid through 
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the new programme NSA-LA. Funds are granted 
through competitive calls for proposals to NSA, 
mainly NGOs, and to a minor degree to LA, which 
are also relevant actors in countries where state 
authorities have launched decentralization proc-
esses. The following section will present issues that 
have emerged during this programme review.
Strong and weak actors within the 
NSA group 
At the time of the review (McCormick et al. 2009), 
the NSA-LA programme had only been under im-
plementation for two years2. It was based upon 
earlier NGO financing programmes and decentral-
ised cooperation instruments, and presented four 
main points of innovation. First, it applied the EU 
de-concentration policy, making EU Delegations 
responsible for managing calls for proposals for in-
country projects. In this way, local EC offices 
would have better possibilities to get local con-
tacts and to respond to the country’s needs. Sec-
ond, the new programme targeted NSAs, and 
therefore involved, besides the traditional NGOs, 
a variety of structured organisations, i.e. trade un-
ions and cooperatives. Third, the programme also 
introduced local authorities as new actors for de-
centralized cooperation. Last but not least, South-
ern NSAs or LAs were allowed to propose and co-
ordinate actions without having to involve EU-
based NSAs, contrarily to what was a pre-require-
ment in earlier aid programmes.
For the sake of clarity, it is also relevant to men-
tion that the NSA-LA programme is not the only EC 
instrument supporting civil society. Others are also 
in place, i.e. the broad European Development 
Fund (EDF) in the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
group of states (ACP), based on the Cotonou 
Agreement of 2000; the European Instrument for 
Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR); and other 
thematic financing programmes targeting specific 
issues like migration, food security and the envi-
ronment. All these programmes are funded through 
calls for proposals. However, in some countries, 
and particularly in those affected by war or politi-
cal crisis, the NSA programme (sometimes without 
the LA component) is the only cooperation instru-
ment of the EC providing direct support to the af-
fected communities. This possibility is ensured by 
the fact that the funded projects do not require to 
be negotiated with the governments of the benefi-
ciary countries, since the principle is to support 
local civil society organisations. In the case of the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT), Iran and 
Zimbabwe, for instance, no other EU cooperation 
mechanisms are in place3. 
As already said, it is evident that despite the pro-
gramme’s title, NGOs still dominated the grant-
receiving projects: trade unions and cooperatives 
are too new to the scene to compete for grants 
with strong, established, experienced NGOs, as 
are local authorities. Essentially, the playing field is 
not even, and the actors the programme intended 
to target are at a distinct disadvantage compared 
with NGOs and INGOs. In some instances, these 
smaller/newer actors were not even given a chance 
to compete, and some interviewed NGO repre-
sentatives were unaware about this programme; 
cooperatives and SMEs met in Georgia were not 
recognized as not-for-profit organizations and 
therefore said they were not eligible for this grant.
Local authorities were also new in this field, and 
their participation in the calls was constrained by 
various circumstances. In Georgia, LAs proposals 
were coordinated by NGOs as LAs were consid-
ered as not sufficiently capable of producing ac-
ceptable project documents. Furthermore, the cen-
tral government was not in favour of allowing LAs 
to receive external financing beyond local taxation 
and state provision. As for the Palestinian Occu-
pied Territories, including Hamas’ ruled munici-
palities, the European Parliament declared LAs in-
eligible to receive funding from this programme. In 
Cameroon, the European Commission only acti-
vated the NSAs component because of wide cor-
ruption problems in the public sector. Also in coun-
tries where LAs are eligible for this programme, 
their involvement is generally weak. For instance, 
in Rwanda the information about this funding was 
blocked by certain LAs in order to limit the compe-
tition. In Rwanda, Zimbabwe and Georgia, LA-
dedicated calls did not have sufficient respondents, 
which demonstrates that basic information about 
grant opportunities have higher market value than 
the very capacity to build good partnerships for de-
velopment and sustainable initiatives.
Power- and competitive relations 
The core aim of the NSA programme is to provide 
support for local actors and their initiatives, no 
matter what their sectors of intervention. The pro-
gramme is said to be actor-oriented and to respect 
the right of initiative of the proposers. However, a 
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first contradiction appears in the definition of pri-
ority areas that are presented in the calls for pro-
posals. Although not generally and unilaterally 
preconceived, these are decided at the country 
level in meetings organized by the EC delegation 
and involving NSAs. While INGOs and other 
strong, mainly capital-based NGOs are effectively 
involved, most deprived, rural and remotely-based 
civil society organisations that theoretically consti-
tute the core beneficiary group of this programme, 
encounter a series of practical constraints (logisti-
cal, digital, relational, political etc.) that make 
them out of reach. This first selection of thematic 
areas consequently weakens those actors aiming 
at initiatives that are not included in the calls’ pri-
orities.
Problems arise because civil society is difficult 
to be conceptualized and even recognized, given 
its multiple forms and informal practices (McEwan 
2009). This is the first main challenge that donors 
face when they aim to financially support commu-
nity-based initiatives. Communities and activist 
groups are linked together through informal net-
works orienting their practices: e.g. groups related 
by gender, ethnicity, neighbourhoods, ancestral 
lands, spatial practices and interests; while in very 
limited cases their agency is expressed in the form 
of associations (Green & Haines 2012). Therefore, 
despite the programme’s intentions, NGOs and 
INGOs end up being the main actors engaged, in-
stead of the local community organizations. This is 
because informality is not accepted by donors 
who work under neoliberal pressures to securitize 
the financial transfer to selected grant holders. 
These have to be organisations with legal status, 
pre-acquired financial capacities and documented 
project experiences. Groups deprived of financial 
and operational assets, no matter their strong hu-
man, social and cultural capitals, need to build 
partnerships with structured organisations, if they 
want to benefit from the European aid programmes. 
As a matter of fact, as we will see later in this chap-
ter, in most cases it is the other way round: exter-
nal NSAs look for locally-based organisations to 
carry out parts of their projects. In both cases, 
project activities are coordinated by external NSAs 
taking responsibility despite poor linkages with the 
target communities.
Similar problems appear when active associa-
tions are not legally recognised by their own states, 
often for political reasons. This precludes them 
from finding funders outside their own state as 
well, e.g. in OPT, Georgia and Zimbabwe. 
In many countries, activists said that the aid in-
dustry was dominated by large NGOs and INGOs 
in terms of physical and human capitals, i.e. inter-
net access, data sources and specialized knowl-
edge in project writing, administration and report-
ing.
In particular, the project-cycle approach seems 
to be limiting the potential of local initiatives. It 
derives from procedures elaborated in external for-
mal environments that are poorly adapted to the 
intervention areas and practically constraint the ef-
fective support to local actors. Project elaborations 
need to include convincing narratives in the offi-
cial language of the EC (mainly English or French), 
work plans and budgets; all applications and other 
communications have to be dealt through the in-
ternet. The language is already a relevant barrier 
for the majority of the visited areas, since other 
languages are locally used. The administrative and 
financial aspects require specialized knowledge of 
the European rules and regulations, for which ded-
icated professionals are needed. Internet access is 
an issue, particularly in rural areas and remote re-
gions, but also in large and the capital cities. These 
problems, and many others, contribute to widen-
ing the distance between community-based or-
ganisations and donors, and even between local 
beneficiaries and granted NGOs that coordinate 
the programmes. At the same time, INGOs’ capac-
ity to address bureaucratic complications empow-
ers them as suitable gateways for the European aid 
towards the local areas and their development 
problems. 
These problems were acknowledged by the in-
terviewed EC officers, but explained away as part 
of a short-term learning curve and a set of things 
that eventually solve themselves. For them, part-
nerships with these large, experienced NGOs 
would somehow allow professionalism and re-
sources to be transferred on local partners: a learn-
ing exercise for the newer, smaller organisations.
This laissez-faire approach sounded quite naïve, 
however. First of all, multi-partnership is not new 
but has existed for decades, and in poor areas it 
has mostly failed to produce operational autono-
my or to generate sufficient financial capacities to 
take over the development business. Large NGOs, 
well equipped in terms of country offices, skilled 
personnel and fund-raising support from their 
headquarters, will probably remain highly com-
petitive for a long period ahead. In some cases, 
INGOs having their headquarters out of Europe, 
have also acquired official addresses in Europe 
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and even in Southern countries, to be eligible for 
EC funding. Their longstanding presence in project 
areas has strengthened their professionalization 
and upward accountability, while at the same time 
it has deepened their capacities to influence local 
development and even act on behalf of local com-
munities in front of donors. During the interviews, 
some local activists argued that the NGOs pater-
nalistic attitude and local control was undermin-
ing the self-reliance of beneficiary groups. There is 
the need, then, to produce objective assessments 
of the down accountability of granted NGOs to-
wards the target communities.
Interviews with staff of INGOs benefiting from 
EC funding also revealed other constraints caused 
by the project-cycle approach. They agreed that 
the project selection was prioritizing well-packed 
proposals against locally-rooted ideas that were 
not expressed in accordance with the guidelines. 
Call openings were seen as occasions to elaborate 
new project ideas, rather than to provide opportu-
nities to strengthen and upscale pre-existing ideas 
or initiatives carried out by actors operating in 
poor conditions. Interviewed development practi-
tioners said that the funded proposals had been 
entirely planned in their offices, and that local 
partners were often selected at a later stage, main-
ly to provide specific services to local communi-
ties, with tasks based on contracts. Relations be-
tween coordinating and executing partners were 
sometimes problematic; in a project based in Pal-
estine, a local partner was even replaced since it 
was failing to deliver in accordance with the con-
tract agreement. 
Other constraints were caused by the available 
budgets in the calls for proposals, which in various 
cases influenced the work plans. For example, one 
INGO’s operator mentioned that commonly “NSA 
budgets limits are 400,000 Euros per project, 
which provides a maximum roof of two years of 
work for international personnel in the field plus 
other running costs, including the NGO office 
rental”. After two years, then, their human resourc-
es need to be re-employed in new projects. Surely 
local employees would cost less, but their priority 
was to guarantee the job to their international staff, 
who had invested their professional life there. 
These practices constitute serious obstacles to 
the goals of local empowerment. In the worse cas-
es, project-cycles involved complex actions im-
plemented in tight schedules, no matter what the 
community requirements, absorptive capacities, 
ownership and consolidation of the results. 
Partnerships in the field: Rwanda
The field work included some visits to selected 
project sites or at least to project personnel. The 
majority of the actions funded by the NSA-LA pro-
gramme were located within the capital regions, 
and only a few were based in peripheral areas. Be-
sides project-specific and technical problems, the 
issues of the local agency’s representation emerged 
in most visits. Some projects were clearly follow-
ing a top-down approach and were granted be-
cause of their professionalism in fund raising, 
while only a few of them were truly community-
based initiatives with clear local ownership. These 
latter ones also deserved attention, particularly for 
the way in which the local agency was expressed.
I will now briefly present two case studies based 
in Rwanda. The first one represents the category of 
projects elaborated from distant offices and giving 
the implementing NGO a dominant role over the 
involved communities, while the second one rep-
resents a best practice, in which the leading NGO 
provides administrative and financial support to a 
genuinely local initiative.
A) ‘Support to social and economic integration 
of historically-marginalized people (Batwa)’
This project was located in the Kayonza Province, 
a peripheral region of Rwanda (Fig. 1). Although 
the proposal was designed and coordinated by a 
Rwandese NGO, a group of professionals headed 
by a former UN-officer and based in Kigali, the 
application was formally submitted by the Kay-
onza district for two reasons: to facilitate the ap-
proval under the LAs-dedicated call that did not 
have as much competition as the NSA sub-call, 
and also because the project responded to a spe-
cific need of the province, to comply with tasks 
assigned by the national government.
In fact, the Kayonza mayor needed to resettle 
200 Batwa families, who had been displaced from 
a forest region at the border with the RD Congo. 
The national government asked the Province of 
Kayonza to take care of the housing needs of this 
group of 1057 people, and the LA chose two vil-
lages, Nyamirama and Kageyo, where returnees 
from refugee camps in Tanzania, mainly of Tutsi 
origin, had already been settled. Batwa’s displace-
ment was due to a national conservation project 
for which their presence was a factor of distur-
bance to the equilibrium of living species (conser-
vation refugees, Dowie 2009), although their past 
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Fig. 1. Map of Rwanda.
history proves that they were part of the forest eco-
system (Robbins 2004). In the new relocation are-
as, Batwa families were not allowed to keep their 
nomadic life but were obliged to settle. The project 
also reflected the national priority of social recon-
ciliation in the aftermath of the 1994 genocide 
(Kinzer 2008). A basic principle of president Kag-
ame’s policy was the peaceful cohabitation in 
mixed neighbourhoods, with no more signs of ra-
cial distinctions that were a legacy of the colonial 
rulers from the 1920s and 1930s (Hintjens 1999). 
Therefore, it was decided that the two communi-
ties, despite their cultural differences, had to live 
together in the new village areas. Batwa families 
had to find shelter and basic earning in those vil-
lages, while the returnees had a relatively better 
situation, particularly in Nyamirama, where hous-
es had already been built by an international 
Christian association. The action also included 
start-up activities of poultry and beekeeping for 
basic earning in both villages.
The situation in the field revealed a situation of 
dominant power relations of the implementing 
NGO towards the local population. The district ad-
ministration had delegated the project coordina-
tion role to the NGO, which had full responsibility 
for any provision of services (e.g. purchase of ma-
terials, design of the housing project, relation with 
the building company, etc.). The absence of active 
involvement of the target communities was evi-
dent, particularly within the Batwa group, whose 
relocation had weakened their traditional liveli-
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hoods and social capital. There was a different sta-
tus between Batwa and returnees: while the first 
group was heavily affected by racial prejudice and 
was maintaining a silent relation with both the 
NGO and the other group, the latter had a progres-
sively better situation and in Nyamirama they had 
one member employed by the project as a refer-
ence point for the management group.
The passive acceptance of the project by the 
Batwa group allowed the works to proceed, de-
spite the fact that the action was revealing strong 
weaknesses: poor house construction materials, 
no connection to drinking water, sanitation net-
works, or electricity; lack of chimneys or ventila-
tion despite the practice of indoor fires; no eco-
nomic start-ups initiated (by the time of the visit, 
that was only few months before the end of the 
project), because the arrival of chicks and bees 
had been delayed; and no civil society empower-
ment-related activities, at all.
Clearly, the empowerment of civil society along 
self-determined development patterns, which was 
proposed as project goal, did not have realistic 
bases. Extreme poverty of the target group, depri-
vation of capital assets and destruction of social 
networks made the local groups so much weaker 
that local authorities could operate through the 
leading non-local NGO, top-down interventions 
of social re-engineering, and livelihoods rebuild-
ing from zero (Scoones 1998). The external NGO 
operated in full adherence with the main national 
policies. The coherence with the principles of na-
tional pacification was sufficient to attract Euro-
pean funding, to the extent that neither the spe-
cific goals of the project, its methodology, opera-
tional modalities or cost-effectiveness, had been 
questioned. On the contrary, the implementing 
NGO was complying with the existing NSA-LA 
guidelines, and were therefore successful in front 
of the EC (upward accountability), despite low 
linkages with the target communities (down ac-
countability). The project was in a remote area 
and visits from EC officers had not taken place, 
since EC procedures did not prescribe project as-
sessments during or at the end of the implementa-
tion4. Finally, the programme guidelines did not 
ensure that the top-down intervention would cre-
ate sustainable benefits to the locals; this kind of 
partnership has not enhanced local capacities. 
There does not appear to have been an improve-
ment of local organisational ability, or position to 
(for instance) apply for a grant like this themselves 
someday.
B) ‘Empowering Nyamirambo Women’s 
centre’ 
This small-scale project was formally proposed by 
a Slovenian NGO, to support an idea expressed by 
a local women’s association based in Nyamiram-
bo, a poor and multicultural suburb of Kigali. The 
idea was simple but very strong: to empower local 
women by strengthening the Nyamirambo Wom-
en’s Centre (NWC). The small centre was shared by 
a group of 18 women, some of which were single 
mothers and/or had been subjected to violence. 
The methodology was based on the acquisition of 
tools that could qualify them to manage the centre 
and to provide learning initiatives and vocational 
training for themselves and for other women in the 
same situation. Some members had a university 
degree, but did not have adequate opportunities to 
generate income or political interest about issues 
of social vulnerability of women in their neigh-
bourhood. The visit to the centre revealed the pres-
ence of a group of active members, animated by 
interests that were at the same time political and 
practical: on the one hand, to sensitize about gen-
der-based violence and women’s and children’s 
rights, and on the other hand, to enable participa-
tion of women in local decision making, particu-
larly where gender segregation is stronger for mat-
ters of education. 
The participation of the Slovenian NGO coordi-
nating the project was limited to the provision of 
training on project design, financial accounting, 
administration and evaluation. Self-organised ac-
tivities included awareness campaigns and educa-
tional programs aimed to improve knowledge and 
employability of NWC members (e.g. to run small 
commerce or acquire property of land, house and 
vehicles), and to widen the group of associates 
from Nyamirambo and beyond. The strategy also 
included initiatives of responsible tourism, to fa-
vour the cultural encounter between NWC mem-
bers and external visitors. Tourists could experi-
ence local life styles, sleep in local houses and 
learn local handcraft skills, and they could volun-
tarily contribute to the NWC activities by offering 
short training sessions. Courses of written English 
and ICT were among the most popular initiatives. 
This type of international networking, locally 
based, could scale up the good practice and fa-
vour further cooperation opportunities (NWC 
2012). 
Like the previous project based in Kayonza, this 
one was also clearly aligned with the national pol-
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icy on multi-ethnic cohabitation, and it was also 
respondent to the Millennium Development 
Goals, with particular reference to the goal ‘pro-
mote gender equality and empower women’. 
However, the success of this project was primarily 
based on local agency, clear ownership of the ini-
tiative, and on fair relation between partners. The 
foreign NSA was effectively instrumental to the lo-
cal agency and maintained the double focus on 
both down and upward accountability. Another 
factor of success was the combination of practical 
initiatives with a clear political agenda of this 
women group. The NWC was a community-based 
organization that was becoming increasingly 
structured, and strong. The project size was small 
and easily manageable as it was mainly relying 
upon local resources, but it could potentially in-
crease in a successive run, would the group sug-
gest a more complex activity plan. Therefore, this 
cooperation was overall sustainable and contrib-
uted in building up the basis for future initiatives of 
the centre.
The localization of the centre played, however, 
a relevant role. Being in the capital area, the group 
could attract highly educated activists and be in 
touch with international travellers and volunteers, 
as well as with donors. Another issue to be consid-
ered is then: how to reach groups that are geo-
graphically and digitally remote? The solution to 
create partnerships between centrally-based 
NGOs, acting as a philtre for international coop-
eration, and marginal community groups, is highly 
risky, as it has been proved for the Kayonza project. 
The question of how to create networks involving 
remote civil society groups remains open for dis-
cussion.
Differentiating NSAs as a means to 
empower local agency
During the period of the programme evaluation, 
some EC delegations involved in the NSA-LA pro-
gramme invited local stakeholders to participate in 
civil society forums. The arguments of local agen-
cy and partnerships were debated, and strong 
 INGOs were criticized by local NSAs for their pa-
ternalistic attitude towards grassroots organisa-
tions, and for their business-oriented approach in 
project implementation. As a matter of fact, during 
my field work, I met many consultants working for 
NGOs engaged in projects, highly educated and 
skilled in diplomatic and business work. Local ac-
tivists revealed that new NGOs were created to 
respond to the new funding opportunities. 
As a response to this criticism, some INGOs en-
sured that in their plans they would need to boost 
the numbers of local employees and that capacity 
building activities would be included in their 
projects to favour local empowerment. 
However, the evidence of the hegemonic role of 
INGOs has recently caused an important change 
in the EU strategy. To decrease the influence of Eu-
ropean NGOs and ensure effective support to lo-
cal actions, it has been decided that Southern part-
nerships can be granted directly, without any 
Northern NSA necessarily involved. Concord 
(2009: 2), the European NGO confederation for 
relief and development, reacted with a letter 
claiming the important role that INGOs play in de-
velopment: 
“European civil society organizations (CSOs) 
were founded in the spirit of North-South solidar-
ity, poverty reduction, empowerment and non-
profit interests. We work together as members of 
international advocacy network to influence deci-
sion-makers on global issues (…). Synergy and 
solidarity between Southern and Northern NGOs 
should be supported. Rather than exacerbating the 
competitive environment, we would welcome dia-
logue on new approaches to reward learning, 
sharing and capacity building. European CSOs 
have learnt the value and impact of investing in 
capacity-building with Southern partners to sup-
port dialogue with the EC, other donors and their 
governments”.
According to Concord, INGOs’ role is to up-
scale local causes and to activate international in-
terest on them. Also at the local level, INGOs con-
sider that their own disempowerment would not 
facilitate the entrance of new and weaker actors 
(e.g. from remote, vulnerable areas or representing 
minorities) in the programme and that it would 
cause a higher competitive, rather than supportive, 
environment. Indeed, as we have seen in the two 
Rwandan cases, neither foreign NGOs did neces-
sarily cause failures in the expression of grassroots 
initiatives, nor was participation of national actors 
a guarantee per se of local ownership of the ac-
tion. 
These considerations help to go beyond a super-
ficial vision of NSA partnerships and to overcome 
the simplistic dichotomy that differentiates local 
from international NSAs. It is evident that the NSA 
category is too broad and undefined, and that 
even within the group of development NGOs 
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there are very diverse associations, more or less 
related to local communities. In a parallel study 
undertaken for the EC, Floridi et al. (2009) propose 
a structural analysis of NSAs into 4 groups, name-
ly: 1) grassroots organizations; 2) associations with 
simple structure, statute, legal recognition and fo-
cus (e.g. cultural, local development, profession-
al); 3) corporate associations provided of central 
headquarters and local branches; and, on the top, 
4) international coalitions. Grassroots organiza-
tions are described as being provided with sub-
stantial community-based knowledge, social mo-
bilization’s capacity, but poorer organization, of-
ten lacking access to information and financial 
means. On the other hand, other competences are 
recognized as belonging to NSAs at the intermedi-
ate and higher structural levels: advocacy and po-
litical influence, operational and financial capaci-
ty, networking etc. These requisites become stron-
ger, going up to higher structural levels, while lo-
cal agency and ownership progressively decrease. 
This structural analysis opens new potentials. It 
helps elaborating guidelines to support fair part-
nerships between NSAs of different structural lev-
els and to prioritize actions where local agency is 
ensured by the presence of grassroots organisa-
tions and focus on social learning and empower-
ment. 
Some relevant attempts have been made by EC 
delegations to address this goal. In the OPT, where 
EC funding was widely granted to fourth-level 
NSAs, the EC delegation introduced a new mecha-
nism in project budgets: a window of sub-grant 
components to be disbursed by the coordinating 
NSAs to first-level organizations through micro-
tenders. However, according to some local activ-
ists, these tenders should remain under the com-
petence of the EC delegations. Otherwise they 
further increase the power of strong NGOs that be-
come project selectors and distributors of funds. In 
fact, coordinating NGOs were often considered as 
donors by the recipient groups. In any case, the EC 
delegation could not take this task for reasons of 
work overload and poor cost-effectiveness of an 
activity that required careful selection procedures 
for small disbursements. Similar problems oc-
curred in another EU programme, the European 
Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EI-
DHR): grassroots organizations were involved as 
‘informal partners’ and were not asked to satisfy 
the same eligibility criteria as the formal appli-
cants, which shall assume financial and account-
ing liability for all expenses incurred by the infor-
mal partners. This mechanism allowed EC funding 
to reach community-based groups, but did not 
guarantee their freedom of utilization without pri-
or negotiation with the leading NGO. Another rel-
evant attempt was made in Cameroon, through a 
project aiming to civil society structuring, funded 
by the European Development Fund (EDF). The 
project organizes training in operational and fi-
nancial management and project writing, helps 
the participant organizations in getting a formal 
status so as to become eligible for funding, and 
launches simplified calls for small-scale initiatives. 
This is an appreciated activity, though it only sup-
ports administrative skills, thus reflecting a bureau-
cratic approach in solving constraints of local 
agency. 
The question is, are pre-stated guidelines for 
new calls for proposals suitable means to stop he-
gemonic partner relations? In a field where infor-
mation, financialization and professionalization 
are fundamental assets, and where cultural influ-
ences inevitably pass through the working prac-
tices, is it realistic to think that community-based 
groups involved in project implementation main-
tain their social capital intact, or is there a risk of 
internal disempowerment (Holland & Skinner 
2008)? These issues remain open for discussion, 
and new ideas are needed.
Conclusions
This article has addressed various issues related to 
aims, practice and effectiveness of the European 
NSA-LAs funding programme; the role of granted 
NSAs in it, and their accountability towards civil 
society, public authorities and donors. The focus 
was mainly on NGOs agency, since other NSAs 
and also LAs had a marginal involvement in the 
NSA-LA programme at the time of the study. More-
over, the paper has presented several constraints 
that impede effective financial support to civil so-
ciety’s initiatives in the fields of poverty alleviation 
and democratic participation. Based on critical 
theories and field analysis, it has highlighted un-
balanced relations in multi-partnerships in favour 
of strong NGOs, and their causes. Some project 
documents have been de-constructed and con-
fronted with the interests of interviewees met in 
the project areas. In some cases, it was clear that 
external NGOs were coordinating actions and 
implementing policies that were designed outside 
the target communities. 
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The poor accessibility of new and vulnerable 
actors to this programme is a key issue that re-
quires specific attention. The hegemonic role that 
strong NSAs acquire through project grants, de-
spite their earlier distance from the beneficiaries, 
is based upon two misleading ideas regarding 
NSAs. The first is that any registered NSAs can rep-
resent the civil society, express its needs and plans, 
and pledge for funding on behalf of it. In the best 
case reported in this article, the coordinating NGO 
supported ideas of a local group but was not rep-
resenting it in front of either the EC delegation, or 
the public authorities; this distinction made the ac-
tion sustainable and clearly owned by the active 
group. The second misconception is that NSAs, al-
though forming a differentiated group, have uni-
form development missions. In fact, development 
practitioners have the tendency to treat NSAs as 
they were forming a monolithic body. On the con-
trary, they present a world of very diverse organi-
zations, with different thematic aims and levels of 
structural complexity (Floridi et al. 2009); different 
interests towards civil society and local agency; 
and different attitudes towards social learning in 
development action (Foley 1999). Each actor has 
specific needs, points of strength and interests, and 
therefore should be targeted in a more differenti-
ated, demand-based way. 
In many observed cases, the involvement of 
strong NSAs was rather unbalanced as it repro-
duced north-south, urban-rural relations of power, 
and did not allow local groups to use their own 
capacities and assets. In general, community-
based organizations are vastly under-represented 
in the current implementation mechanisms of the 
NSA-LA programme. They have enormous poten-
tial in terms of respect for civil society’s identities, 
social capital and local livelihood assets and can 
provide solid background for sustainable plan-
ning. However, their initiatives have not been suf-
ficiently supported, because of practical difficul-
ties to convert them into a successful project for-
mat. The current funding mechanisms are not suit-
able for local groups and often suffocate commu-
nity initiatives. The paper has identified various 
bottle-necks and also some solutions applied by 
the EC delegations. Other constraints are caused 
by insufficient evaluations of ongoing projects. 
While monitoring reports carefully inform about 
work plans and budget expenditures, they often 
neglect local impacts and sustainability factors. 
Community participation and equity across the 
overall project cycle should be evaluated by par-
ticipatory appraisals with the beneficiary groups 
(i.e. IIED 2006). In some observed cases, like in 
the Kayonza project, paternalistic relations en-
gaged by external NGOs and situations of subjec-
tion of weaker partners could be clearly recog-
nised, would donors pay evaluation visits to the 
project sites, also in remote areas.
A more coherent selection process of proposals 
should be operated, in line with the set priorities of 
local agency. The civil society’s right of initiative 
should not be stopped for required alignment with 
EC parameters of either bureaucratic or thematic 
nature. Stronger weight should be given to ideas 
coming from local groups, rewarding their en-
gagement and social rooting, no matter their infor-
mal status or poor financial wealth, which are the 
current discriminating factors. The current com-
petitive criteria based on the NSA’s operational 
and financial capacity, previous experience in in-
ternational projects, work plan, budget formula-
tion and short term deliverables, make projects a 
product of the aid industry and not for communi-
ties; they therefore reward the most competitive 
groups instead of the more needy and deprived 
ones. Different funding mechanisms for different 
types of NSAs might pose a possible strategy, and 
the EC should make a choice by using this specific 
NSA-LA programme to prioritize community local 
knowledge and agency by giving support to their 
ideas. Participatory appraisals should be utilized to 
evaluate the project impacts; periodical stakehold-
ers’ dialogue in the fields and visits to the project 
sites by the EC officers in the delegations should 
enter in their working routine. This was also the 
wish of the interviewed EC personnel, who found 
it difficult to familiarize with their projects only 
through activity and budget reports. This approach 
would be more coherent with the idea of projects 
as learning environments: not only for local civil 
society organizations, but for all parties involved. 
NOTES
1 Differences with other countries in Latin America 
and Asia, visited by the other members of the review 
team, were even stronger. A summary report and dif-
ferent thematic annexes were produced. The report 
was published online and presented in a public fo-
rum, to allow stakeholders to discuss the findings. 
This was a good opportunity to collect very valuable 
feedback to be incorporated into the final report (Mc-
Cormick et al. 2009).
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2 The NSA-LA programme has different sub-areas, re-
sponding to 3 main objectives: 1) support to develop-
ment actions; 2) promoting education for develop-
ment in the EU, and 3) development of networks in 
EU countries. The second and third sub-areas are out 
of the scope of this study. The first sub-area includes 
either multi-country or in-country initiatives, but this 
article will only consider the in-country sub-pro-
gramme that involves the largest funding share and is 
central to the topics discussed. This sub-programme 
is managed by the EC delegations in developing 
countries and has gained increasing popularity in the 
beneficiary countries for being one of the few funding 
mechanisms theoretically accessible to NGOs.
3 The political implications and reactions that this di-
rect cooperation entails, though relevant, cannot be 
discussed here.
4 My visit had a different purpose, since it was made 
in the framework of the overall NSA-LA programme 
assessment.
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